For nearly twenty year, Kim Philby was the premier Soviet spy, rising through the ranks of the British Secret Service, acting as the head of Soviet counterintelligence for the British (he was charged to chase himself), and worked closely with both the CIA and the FBI (under Hoover). This book starts out with an excellent introduction by Phillip Knightley who studied Philby for thirty years, and an exciting foreword by Graham Greene who not only knew Philby, but even visited him in Moscow after Philby fled the U.K. From there however, the book fails to meet the promise.
Philby, in his position, was able to pass literally mountains of secrets to the Soviets and was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of anti-Soviet agents across Europe. He was a true believer; he did not betray his country for money, but he did believe in the goal of Communism. Even though he knew the true scope of Stalin’s crimes against his own people, he kept the faith based on a belief (as modern-day apologists proclaim) that it was not the “system”, but it was rather the wrong person at the top. Yet he like today’s apologists never face the question of what kind of system is it that allows a murderer like Stalin to take control and exist for so long.
Almost the entire book covers his rapid promotion within the British Secret Service, but we get none of the details of how he worked with the Soviets, the difficulties that he encountered, how he transmitted information, who was his handler, even how he was greeted when he finally fled to the Soviet Union. How did he feel knowing of the men who died because of his actions, did he ever have any qualms, doubts, etc.?
Philby was so successful because he blended in so well, so smoothly with the norms and customs of those around him. He did not have a false identity, a new name, etc., he was just acting as himself and he must have had a remarkably cool temperament. Here was a man who could literally sign the death warrants for many men and who apparently never gave it a second thought. He may have been a psychopath or perhaps he had so shielded himself from his actions by believing the was serving a greater good. But then what was the difference between him and Stalin, or a commander of a SS killing squad, etc.?
This book is a good basic primer on some of the growing pains of both the U.S. and U.K. secret services, including the interdepartmental politics, but if you are looking into an inside of how a great spy worked and his thinking process, you will be sadly disappointed.
