About every ten years or so I go on a Civil War binge and this binge has started with this excellent book by two fine military historians. Murray is professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University and his many books closely examine the changes in military thinking and tactics as well as the culture of both the military and their society in which they exist. Hsieh is associate professor of history at the United State Naval Academy. Together they have created a fine work that not only gives the details on the various campaigns, but the strengths and weaknesses of commanders down to the regimental level as well as how both the North and the South responded to the size, scope and technology of the Civil War battlefield.
The battlefield was huge; many think of the battlefields of Europe being huge, in reality, they were for the most part, amazingly small, especially in comparison to what Grant and Lincoln faced during the war. Consider; the distance from Baton Rouge to Richmond exceeds that of the Franco-German border to Moscow and “even Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, launched from based in East Prussia and Poland …did not have to control the vast territory Union armies needed to conquer and hold.” When on realizes that the road and rail network in most of the Confederacy was at best primitive, the North’s ability to move hundreds of thousands of men and their supplies begins to be viewed in a new light. The technology of the Industrial Revolution was harnessed by the North and the concept of combined arms strategy (land and naval) was widely used despite growing pains by the North. In terms of the ability to move men and supply them, the Union surpassed the skills of the Europeans during their much smaller wars of German Unification and much of the First World War.
On the other side, the South never seemed to understand either the technology of the age or the importance of logistics. While the South’s industrial base was small, it was poorly managed and squandered; 25% of the South’s steel production was used in the construction of ironclad warships which paid little if any part for the South and during the war, the South did not product a single railroad engine. Logistically, the War in the West handled so well by Grant, deprived the South of much of it’s ability to feed it’s troops and encouraged early desertions as many left the army to return to their now Union dominated farms.
Another important part of this book is the brutally honest assessments of Jefferson Davis, Generals Bragg, Lee, many of the Union generals, etc. President Lincoln emerges as a truly great man; his ability to hold together his cabinet, each one who was sure he should have been in Lincoln’s shoes, his ability to learn about military matters both from books and practical experience (unlike Jefferson Davis who let his personal likes and dislikes ruin more than on Confederate army) and his willingness to fire failed generals all place him on a level seldom reached by “great” leaders. While the Grant, especially when he became commander in chief, had to over come the caution and slowness of the Army of the Potomac, his opponent, Lee continued to believe in the concept of elan which may have been his only real weapon. A fractured political system in the Confederacy, lack of manufacturing and dependency on slave labor which capital intensive and inefficient created a series of obstacles for a Confederate victory.
I have read numerous histories of the Civil War, from the viewpoint of the South to more traditional historians, but this single volume is the one I would take to a desert island. My immediate thought upon finishing it was one of sadness (it is done!) and a desire to begin to re-read it so pick up the wonderful insights that I know I must have missed with that reading. No other book on the Civil War covers the topic so completely and provide so much food for thought. The authors have created a wonderful mosaic of biography, technology, personalities, and more into this excellent book.
